UNDERESTIMATED KUDANKULAM REACTOR MOCK DRILLS FOR ACCIDENTS

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao

Director, Center for Environmental Studies,

GITAM University,

Visakhapatnam-530045

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report2/ 
(Lessons from Fukushima by Japan Government. See Chapter-VI) http://tshivajirao.blogspot.in/2012/10/wrongly-built-nuclear-plants-are-closed.html
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/indianpoint/files/NRDC-1336_Indian_Point_FSr8medium.pdf 
(Latest emergency plans show radioactive fallout spread upto 200Km and damage of $1 trillion)

GOVERNMENTS PRESENT WRONG EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANS FOR KUDANKULAM REACTORS:

 why should AERB, DAE, NPCIL, Tamil nadu state and union government mislead the public by furnishing an unscientific and wrong accident scenario and under-designed disaster  management, emergency preparedness plans for Kudankulam nuclear plant?

The true facts can be understood if only the people become aware of how the American citizens have projected the Fukushima like explosion scenarios over the dozens of nuclear plants in their country so that they can visualize what kinds of hazards they will be exposed in case such accidents occur within the near future in their own country.  One of the important non-Governmental organizations NGO namely the National Resources Defence Council (NRDC) consisting of hundreds of scientists and advocates and other experts worked together and prepared the emergency preparedness plans for nuclear plant explosions in different localities on the basis of  the local meteorological and environmental conditions including the population in villages, towns and cities around the reactors.  Some of these case studies have been presented in the form of figures along with some details which are self explanatory and such  scenarios must be projected over the Kudankulam nuclear reactor to understand how many thousands of people will have to be evacuated to safe places during an accident.   

Similarly another case study on Nuclear Plant explosion scenario in Ohio state which has been presented by MIT experts  namely Dr.Fetter and Dr.Tsipis as published by the International Journal Scientific American (1981) is also presented under 3 figures, one for the 1000MW nuclear power plant near Milwake, Lake Michigan , USA is presented with the nuclear accident scenario and disaster management plan, a second figure showing the reactor accident due to nuclear bombing over the reactor and a third figure showing the travel of nuclear reactor debris due to the explosion of a nuclear bomb on the ground. The first two scenarios must be projected over Kudankulam reactor which can experience an accident due to nuclear bombing by terrorists or enemy countries and the Kudankulam reactor may also explode due to sabotage, a major plane accident or due to terrorist or crash of a meteorite or a satellite.

NOTE:The Kudankulam nuclear plant authorites have  conducted a farcical Mock Drill to prove that they have prepared the emergency preparedness plans on proper lines and announced that they have conducted the exercise successfully although it was based on most unscientific calculations and false information on source terms to be used as radioactive emissions from the reactor due to an explosion.  Since the exercise was conducted only in one village and that to a short distance of 7km from the reactor site they Mock Drill exercise must be considered invalid from both legal and nuclear safety angels.  The people must demand for a fresh disaster management plan and  emergency preparedness plan and place them before the millions of people around the plant so that they can receive constructive suggestions to ensure not only the safety of the reactor but also safety of the people, animal populations and environmental resources in  the surrounding districts of Kudankulam site. 

 

 

Due to the callousness of the Atomic Energy Ministers, Officials, Scientists, Engineers and  state Government officials they are not able to make an indepth study on nuclear reactor safety  and public safety and hence failed to grasp that nuclear safety is a myth as confirmed by International experts and also the heads of countries like Japan and Germany who decided to abandon nuclear plants within the next 20 years. Unfortunately due to lack of awareness about the scientific and environmental safety importance for sustainable development and inspite of the lessons from the nuclear explosions at Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011, the  Kudankulam nuclear plant authorities are violating  the AERB and International guidelines formulated by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in promoting public health and environmental safety which requires the preparation of the nuclear reactor explosion scenario and the disaster management as followed in many countries including USA and the guidelines of the National Disaster Management Authority furnished in the guidelines on radiological safety as per website

http://ndma.gov.in/ndma/guidelines/Management+of+Nuclear+&+Radiological+Emergencies.pdf

6.2 Preparedness for Nuclear/Radiological Emergencies

The handling of nuclear emergencies requires coordination among different service groups of the nuclear facility. In the event of potential radiological consequences in the public domain, all the authorities at the three levels, i.e., district, state and central, will play a vital role.

6.2.1 Major Responsibilities of Nuclear Power Plant Operators

This includes the arrangements required to promptly classify an emergency, mitigate the emergency, notify and recommend protective actions off the site consistent with international guidelines, protect those on site, obtain off-site assistance, conduct environmental monitoring of the affected area and assist off-site officials in keeping the public informed.

6.2.2 Major Responsibilities of Off-Site Officials

This includes the arrangements required to promptly implement protective actions and countermeasures in the affected area.

6.3 Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Power Plants

Since the proper implementation of countermeasures can significantly reduce the consequences of an emergency situation,

It is mandatory for all nuclear facilities that there must be a comprehensive emergency preparedness plan.

Prior to the issuance of a license for the operation of a nuclear facility, the AERB ensures that the facility has the Emergency Response Manuals for the three main types of emergencies, viz., plant, on-site and off-site, and that the plans are in place to handle these types of emergencies.

The operators of nuclear facilities must make an assessment of the type and quantum of release of radioactivity under various accident conditions and the extent to which it can spread into the environment.

DIVISION OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG STATE AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS:

1)      The response actions within the site boundary of the nuclear facility are the responsibility of the management of the nuclear facility.

2)      But the implementation of the emergency response plan in the public domain (beyond the site boundary) is the responsibility of the concerned district authority.

3)       In the event an off-site emergency having the potential for trans-boundary effects, necessary action is taken by DAE in accordance with the country’s international obligations.

The operating authorities of nuclear facilities in India already have an emergency response plan in place to be invoked in the event of an emergency, which is tested during periodic exercises as per international practice.

AERB SAFETY CODE FOR NUCLEAR PLANTS:

According to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) regulations contained in the website below

http://www.aerb.gov.in/T/PUBLICATIONS/CODESGUIDES/SC-D1.pdf

the following points govern the nuclear safety for the reactor, the people and their environmental assets.

Nuclear Safety

The achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from undue radiation hazards.

Nuclear Security

All preventive measures taken to minimize the residual risk of unauthorised transfer of nuclear material and/or sabotage, which could lead to release of radioactivity and/or adverse impact on the safety of the plant, plant personnel, public and environment.

Items Important to Safety (IIS)

The items which comprise:

· those structures, systems, equipment and components whose malfunction or failure could lead to undue radiological consequences at plant site or off-site;

· those structures, systems, equipment and components which prevent anticipated operational occurrences from leading to accident conditions;

· those features which are provided to mitigate the consequences of malfunction or failure of structures, systems, equipment or components.

Level 1 PSA (Nuclear Reactor)

It evaluates core damage frequency by developing and quantifying accident sequences (event trees) with postulated initiating events together with system unavailability values derived from fault tree analyses with inputs from failure data on components, common causes and human actions.

Level 2 PSA (Nuclear Reactor)

It takes inputs from Level 1 PSA results and quantifies the magnitude and frequency of radioactive release to the environment following core damage progression and containment failure.

Level 3 PSA (Nuclear Reactor)

Taking inputs from Level 2 analysis, it evaluates frequency and magnitude of radiological consequences to the public, environment and the society considering meteorological conditions, topography, demographic data, radiological release and dispersion models.

NOTE BY THE AUTHOR: The author emphasizes that  unless Kudankulam reactor authorities prove the feasibility of emergency evacuation by conducting successful mock drills AERB should not give clearance for commissioning of the plant even for the first stage out of 6 stages needed for final clearance to start production of electricity from the nuclear plant.   

LIST OF SAFETY FUNCTIONS

A list of safety functions,4 performed by various SSCs, is given below. For classification, each SSC is identified with related safety functions in this list. The serial designation (a, b, c, etc.) assigned to the safety functions below are referred to later at various places in AERB safety guides for reference purposes.

(a) To prevent unacceptable reactivity transients.

(b) To maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition after all shutdown actions.

(c) To shut down the reactor as required to prevent anticipated operational occurrences from leading to accident conditions and to shutdown the reactor to mitigate the consequences of accident conditions (see also (d)).

(d) To shut down the reactor on sensing a loss-of-coolant accident.

(e) To maintain sufficient reactor coolant inventory for core cooling during and after all operational states.

(f) To remove heat from the core1 after a failure of the reactor coolant pressure boundary in order to limit fuel damage.

(g) To remove decay heat during appropriate operational states and accident conditions with the reactor coolant pressure boundary intact.

(h) To transfer heat from other systems to the ultimate heat sink.

(i) To ensure necessary services (e.g., electric, pneumatic, hydraulic power supplies, lubrication) as a support function for the safety systems.

(j) To maintain acceptable integrity of the cladding of the fuel in the reactor core.

(k) To maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

(l) To limit the release of radioactive material from the reactor containment during and after an accident.

(m) To keep the radiation exposure of the public and site personnel within acceptable limits during and after accident conditions that release radioactive materials from sources outside the reactor containment.

(n) To limit the discharge or release of radioactive waste and airborne radioactive material below the prescribed limits during all operational states.

(o) To control environmental conditions within the nuclear power plant for operation of safety systems and for personnel habitability necessary to allow performance of operations important to safety.

(p) To control radioactive releases from irradiated fuel transported or stored outside the reactor coolant system, but within the site, during all operational states.

 (q) To remove decay heat from irradiated fuel stored outside the reactor coolant system, but within the site.

(r) To maintain sufficient sub-criticality of the fuel stored outside the reactor coolant system but within the site.

(s) To prevent the failure or limit the consequences of failure of a component or structure which would cause the impairment of a safety function.

(t) To provide information and control capabilities for specified manual actions required to mitigate the consequences of a PIE and prevent it from leading to a significant sequence68.

(u) To continuously monitor the systems to accomplish their protective and mitigating safety functions or to alert the control room staff of failures in these systems.

(v) To control the plant so that the process variables are maintained within the limits assumed in the safety analysis.

(w) To limit the consequences of events such as a fire or flood.